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SAVED BY LABELL: LOCAL TAXATION OF
VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES
Salvatore Cocchiaro*
Over the last few years, Netflix and other video streaming services have
erupted to become a preeminent form of entertainment for millennials and
the public at large. With traditional forms of entertainment waning, video
streaming services represent a novel source of revenue for cities. Local
governments currently have numerous tax approaches that may be used to
cover these services.
Different cities and states have taken distinctive approaches to taxing
these services. Certain jurisdictions tax them in line with traditional pay-TV
providers under utility taxes, while other jurisdictions tax them under sales
or amusement taxes. This Note considers these different approaches, with a
focus on Labell v. City of Chicago, a 2018 case upholding Chicago’s
application of its amusement tax to Netflix and other video streaming
services.
Recognizing the various constraints that state and federal laws place on
local taxation, this Note outlines the benefits and drawbacks of different
approaches and highlights the challenges that cities should consider when
issuing interpretive rulings to bring video streaming services into their tax
bases. This Note suggests that other cities should draw on Labell and follow
Chicago’s lead in taxing these services under existing amusement tax laws
where possible, given the easier procedural hurdles, strong theoretical
backing, and recent supporting precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION
As the phrase goes, nothing in life is certain but death and taxes.1 The
2002 smash-hit film Chicago,2 based on the 1975 Broadway musical of the
same name, chronicles a satirical murder trial in Chicago during the Roaring
Twenties. As the story goes, the brilliant attorney Billy Flynn razzle-dazzles3
his way to victory against the City, exclaiming: “Believe me, if Jesus Christ
had lived in Chicago today and if he had five thousand dollars and he’d come
to me, let’s just say things would have turned out differently.”4 At the heart
of this Note is another Chicago trial, not concerning death but taxes.
In Labell v. City of Chicago,5 a Chicago trial court considered whether the
city’s taxation of Netflix and other video streaming services was valid,
despite municipal tax limitations, dormant Commerce Clause issues, and the

1. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10
THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790, at 68, 69 (Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907),
http://archive.org/details/writingsofbenjam10franuoft/page/68 [http://perma.cc/8kkh-xvc4].
2. CHICAGO (Miramax Films 2002).
3. See RICHARD GERE, Razzle Dazzle, on CHICAGO: MUSIC FROM THE MIRAMAX MOTION
PICTURE (Epic Records 2002).
4. CHICAGO, supra note 2, at 41:02.
5. No. 15 CH 13399, 2018 BL 212206 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2018).

2019]

SAVED BY LABELL

1615

Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA).6 As consumers continue to cut the cord
and ditch traditional pay-TV, the decision in Labell has potentially massive
revenue implications not only for Chicago, but also for the multitude of cities
and states mulling these so-called “Netflix taxes.”7 Fortunately for them, the
City of Chicago prevailed and the court upheld the tax’s validity and
provided a roadmap for similar challenges.8 The issue, however, is far from
settled. Judicial challenges continue to pop up,9 while Labell itself remains
on appeal.10 In light of Labell, this Note examines the question: Under what
authority can cities tax video streaming services such as Netflix?
Part I of this Note addresses the rise of video streaming services and their
relationship to traditional pay-TV providers, or multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs). It then examines basic tools of tax
interpretation, including the substance-over-form doctrine and the sliding
scale of deference afforded to tax-commissioner rulings. Finally, it considers
various principles of local taxation, with a focus on the variety of taxing
approaches at a local government’s disposal.
Part II of this Note surveys the current state and local government
approaches that tax video streaming services differently from MVPDs, with
a focus on Labell. It then considers approaches that tax video streaming
services in line with MVPDs, as illustrated in Netflix, Inc. v. Finance &
Administration Cabinet Department of Revenue.11 Lastly, it considers key
constraints on local taxation, including state limitations on municipal tax
discretion, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, and the ITFA.
Part III argues that in light of Labell, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,12 and
the deference afforded to tax commissioner rulings, cities should follow the
same roadmap and issue interpretive rulings to bring video streaming
services into the taxable fold via an amusement tax. Furthermore,
recognizing the substance-over-form doctrine and the practical difficulties
6. Id. at *1.
7. This Note refers to taxes on “video streaming services” rather than “Netflix taxes”
because, while the latter is catchy, it is counterproductive, making such taxation politically
unpalatable. See John Buhl, Netflix and Bill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2018-02-12/the-netflix-taxhow-states-are-attempting-to-tax-consumption [https://perma.cc/9TUR-BPVK] (suggesting
that failed attempts at video streaming service taxation by Louisiana and Virginia were due in
part to their “eye-popping label[s]”). A number of cities and states, such as Chicago,
Pennsylvania, and Florida, have enacted such taxes. Mike Snider, A ‘Netflix Tax’? Yes, and
It’s Already a Thing in Some States, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/news/2017/08/17/netflix-tax-yes-and-its-already-thing-some-states/500416001/
[https://perma.cc/QC3Q-4PHU].
8. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *12.
9. See, e.g., Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief, City of Creve Coeur v.
Netflix, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01495 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Creve
Coeur Petition]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Apple Inc. v. City of
Chicago, No. 2018L05052014 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Apple Complaint].
10. See Appellants’ Brief at 2, Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 1-18-1379 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 5, 2018) (stating that the plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 2018).
11. No. K-24900, 2015 WL 5692791 (Ky. B.T.A. Sept. 23, 2015).
12. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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cities face in taxation, this Note concludes by suggesting that cities should
feel at liberty to elect any consumption tax they prefer to bring these services
within their tax bases.
I. ACT ONE: VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES, LOCAL TAXATION,
AND “ALL THAT JAZZ”
To discuss local taxation of video streaming services, it is important to
understand the industry, taxation schemes, and “all that jazz.”13 Part I.A
describes what video streaming services are and their role in the media and
entertainment industry, including their relationship with MVPDs. Part I.B
addresses tools of tax interpretation, including the substance-over-form
doctrine and the deference afforded to tax commissioner rulings. Part I.C
assesses the various approaches that cities have taken to tax these video
streaming services.
A. Modern-Day TV: Video Streaming Services
Any discussion regarding video streaming services must begin with an
introduction to key terminology. Video streaming services14 enable users to
access video content via the internet without using TV subscription providers
or permanently downloading such content.15 Video streaming services may
be further broken down into primarily two distinct models: subscription
video on demand (SVOD), and transactional video on demand (TVOD).16
The SVOD model provides access to a bundle of content for one flat price.17
Key players in this area currently include Netflix and Hulu.18 The TVOD
model provides access to individual films or TV titles for a limited period,
typically structured as a forty-eight hour rental.19 Key players in this area
13. See CATHERINE ZETA-JONES, Overture/And All
THE MIRAMAX MOTION PICTURE (Epic Records 2002).

That Jazz, on CHICAGO: MUSIC FROM

14. Different authors use different terminology to refer to such providers, including, but
not limited to: video streaming services, video service providers, over-the-top (OTT)
providers, internet streaming service providers, internet-based streaming services, and online
video service providers. Although these terms emphasize different aspects of the business,
they are interchangeable for purposes of this Note’s treatment of the taxation issue. This
Note’s preferred term is video streaming services.
15. Outlook Segment Definitions: OTT Video, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/
industries/tmt/media/outlook/segment-definitions.html [https://perma.cc/D6C3-MK32] (last
visited Feb. 12, 2019); see also Sahil Patel, WTF Is OTT?, DIGIDAY (July 7, 2015),
https://digiday.com/media/what-is-over-the-top-ott/ [https://perma.cc/5DWM-2AZT]. For
the purposes of this Note, streamed content does not include permanently downloaded
purchases, despite their conflation in the everyday use of the term.
16. Outlook Segment Definitions: OTT Video, supra note 15; see also Patel, supra note
15. There is a third category of OTT, advertising video on demand. Due to its relatively small
market size compared to SVOD and TVOD, this Note will not discuss this segment.
17. Patel, supra note 15; see, e.g., What Is Netflix?, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/
en/node/412 [https://perma.cc/HP5L-7RTN] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (describing Netflix as
a service in which a subscriber pays a flat, monthly fee to access unlimited streaming content).
18. Patel, supra note 15.
19. Id.; see, e.g., Rent Movies from the iTunes Store, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/enus/HT201611 [https://perma.cc/9CKA-7DXM] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (explaining that
iTunes video rentals last forty-eight hours after a user begins watching).
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currently include iTunes and Vimeo On Demand.20 Amazon’s video
streaming service, Prime Video, offers users both an SVOD option and a
TVOD option.21
Over the last decade, video streaming services have reached near ubiquity.
While video streaming services continue to grow and dominate the current
entertainment and media landscape, related traditional industries have taken
massive hits over the last decade. The home-video industry, largely
represented by Blockbuster, has been rated the number one dying industry in
America.22 Movie theater attendance in North America is at its lowest point
since 1992—the continuation of an ongoing drop in attendance and domestic
revenue.23 Physical disc sales in the United States continue to plummet and
have experienced double-digit percentage declines in back-to-back years.24
Traditional pay-TV providers, including cable and satellite providers, are
experiencing larger-than-expected subscriber losses25 and declining
advertising revenues26 as “cord-cutting” continues to accelerate. Illustrative
of this trend, traditional pay-TV providers recently experienced their largest
quarterly loss ever.27 Scholars and practitioners attribute this decline to an
ascendant video streaming industry.28
20. Patel, supra note 15.
21. Andy Beatman, What Is Prime Video?, AMAZON PRIME INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.amazon.com/primeinsider/video/prime-video-qa.html [https://perma.cc/7LE36S3T] (“With an eligible Amazon Prime membership, you have access to thousands of Prime
Video titles at no additional cost. You also have the option to rent . . . movies and TV episodes
not included with Prime Video.”).
22. Trey Thoelcke, Video Rental Is America’s Most Quickly Dying Industry, 24/7 WALL
ST. (Dec. 30, 2016), https://247wallst.com/services/2016/12/30/video-rental-is-americasmost-quickly-dying-industry/ [https://perma.cc/W5CK-F7NH]. Based upon data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry employment is down 89 percent from its high in 2006,
and Blockbuster has shut all of its locations since declaring bankruptcy in 2010. Id.
23. Lizzie Plaugic, Domestic Movie Theater Attendance Hit a 25-Year Low in 2017,
VERGE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/3/16844662/movie-theaterattendance-2017-low-netflix-streaming [https://perma.cc/6TUM-EDR7].
24. Ricardo Lopez, Disc Sales Decline Deepens in Annual Home Entertainment Spending
Report, VARIETY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/home-entertainmentspending-2017-1202658638/ [https://perma.cc/MFA5-747N].
25. See David Z. Morris, Viewers Are Ditching Cable for Streaming Faster Than Anyone
Expected, FORTUNE (Apr. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/04/29/viewers-cable-streaming/
[https://perma.cc/3UKD-AFL3].
26. See Sapna Maheshwari & John Koblin, Why Traditional TV Is in Trouble,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/media/televisionadvertising.html [https://perma.cc/FSP8-S88G].
27. The loss of more than one million subscribers from July to September 2018 was the
largest ever, with pay-TV subscriptions now down from 86 percent in 2013 to 78 percent in
2018. Some predict the downhill trend will continue and that number will continue to fall.
See Mike Snider, Cord Cutting Accelerates as Pay TV Loses One Million Customers in
Largest-Ever Quarterly Loss, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/talkingtech/2018/11/07/cord-cutting-accelerates-1-m-customers-dropped-pay-tv-lastquarter/1919471002/ [https://perma.cc/A97M-GKLD].
28. See Lopez, supra note 24 (claiming that decreased ownership of movie titles is due to
consumer preference for video streaming services); Maheshwari & Koblin, supra note 26
(suggesting that cord-cutters are instead watching video streaming services such as Netflix);
Plaugic, supra note 23 (attributing declining movie-theater attendance and revenues to video
streaming service viewership); Emily Quijano, The Collapse of the Video Rental Industry,
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The sheer growth and amount of money spent on video streaming services
are staggering: more than half of all U.S. homes subscribe to such services,
which accounts for more than two billion dollars in monthly receipts.29
These offerings continue to expand as additional competitors enter the
market. For example, the Walt Disney Company recently announced its own
streaming platform that is set to feature premier Disney, Pixar, Marvel, and
Lucasfilm content.30 With the modern tech disruption of video streaming
services echoing that of the television just decades ago, a comparison of the
two is only natural.31
Video streaming services are often compared to more traditional video
content providers, such as cable television32 and MVPDs.33 In short, an
MVPD is an umbrella term that includes more traditional forms of video
distributors, such as cable and satellite providers.34 The industry is currently
dominated by the “Core Four” MVPDs, which includes AT&T, Comcast,
Charter Communications, and Dish Network.35 Because these MVPDs also
serve as the predominant facilities-based internet service providers, their
relationship with video streaming services cuts in both directions. On the
one hand, as the internet is increasingly used for video streaming, with giants
such as Netflix accounting for 15 percent of all worldwide downstream
internet traffic alone, MVPDs stand to gain from more internet customers
and greater usage.36 On the other hand, this puts MVPDs in direct
MAGNIFICAT (Apr. 2017), https://commons.marymount.edu/magnificat/the-collapse-of-thevideo-rental-industry/ [https://perma.cc/N9PJ-LBBD] (crediting the emergence of digital
business models for the downfall of the home video rental industry).
29. Christine Wang, More Than Half of US Homes Now Subscribe to a Streaming Service,
Spending $2.1 Billion a Month, CNBC (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/
streaming-services-americans-spend-2-point-1-billion-a-month-in-55-percent-homes.html
[https://perma.cc/C4NE-UZVR].
30. Michelle Castillo, Disney’s New Netflix Rival Will Be Called Disney+ and Launch
Late 2019, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/disneys-new-netflixrival-will-be-called-disney-plus-and-launch-late-2019.html [https://perma.cc/FV3R-GV39].
31. Arne Alsin, The Future of Media: Disruptions, Revolutions and the Quest for
Distribution, FORBES (July 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aalsin/2018/07/19/thefuture-of-media-disruptions-revolutions-and-the-quest-for-distribution/#4b5b64d260b9
[https://perma.cc/E4EQ-PLDN].
32. Cable Television, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/
media/engineering/cable-television [https://perma.cc/7BUW-J7Y6] (“Cable television is a
video delivery service provided by a cable operator to subscribers via a coaxial cable or fiber
optics.”).
33. Id. (“A multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person such as,
but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct
broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who
makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video
programming.”).
34. Id.
35. Mike Farrell, Four for the Money, MULTICHANNEL (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.multichannel.com/news/top-25-mvpds-411157 [https://perma.cc/249F-J6F8].
Together, these four MVPDs service more than 80 percent of U.S. homes according to a recent
study. Id.
36. SANDVINE, THE GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 7 (2018),
https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/phenomena/2018-phenomena-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HP7F-HQY4] (determining that Netflix is the largest downstream internet
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competition with video streaming services, which deliver video
entertainment of the same look and feel but retain many strategic advantages
over their MVPD peers.37 Video streaming services, unlike MVPDs, remain
unregulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and face
comparatively low economic costs since they do not require costly
infrastructure investments to deliver their content.38 MVPDs, on the other
hand, are extensively regulated and bear high costs, though they retain
benefits not available on video streaming services, like dedicated bandwidth
(hence, no buffering) and live broadcast television.39
This widespread shift toward online viewing has prompted MVPDs to
directly compete with SVODs by making their content available online either
ancillary to subscribers’ television packages or independently as SVODs
themselves.40 Moreover, even local broadcasters are attempting to reconcile
their programming with online viewership trends by making local market
content streamable.41 Taken together, it should come as no surprise that
cities are eager to get a bite of the ever-growing apple.
B. Tools of Tax Interpretation
As local governments look to tax video streaming services, the
interpretation of these tax laws is guided by certain principles. Part I.B.1
addresses the substance-over-form doctrine, while Part I.B.2 discusses the
sliding scale of deference afforded to interpretive rulings of tax
commissioners.
1. The Substance-over-Form Doctrine
Courts have employed various doctrines to aid in the interpretation and
application of tax laws to particular transactions.42 One such doctrine is
known as the substance-over-form doctrine, which allows a court to
disregard how a tax is labeled and look directly to its substance to determine
application worldwide); Charles R. Naftalin, Video Distribution Competition in the Internet
Age, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 105, 109–10 (Aspatore 2013);
Sahil Patel, Why Comcast Argues It’s Not Too Worried About Streaming TV Bundles, DIGIDAY
(July 26, 2018), https://digiday.com/media/why-comcast-argues-its-not-too-worried-aboutstreaming-tv-bundles/ [https://perma.cc/3JE8-DDG7].
37. Naftalin, supra note 36, at 110–11.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Take, for example, AT&T making the same content of its premium network, HBO,
available in both ways through HBO GO and HBO NOW. While “HBO GO is a streaming
service included free with [a user’s] paid HBO subscription through a TV provider[,] HBO
NOW is a stand-alone streaming service that doesn’t require cable or satellite TV.” What Is
HBO NOW and How Is It Different from HBO GO?, HBO GO HELP CTR.,
https://help.hbogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204177788-What-is-HBO-NOW-and-how-is-itdifferent-from-HBO-GO- [https://perma.cc/DHM4-7A72] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
41. See, e.g., CBS to Launch CBSN Local Streaming Service to Expand Digital Reach,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-to-launch-cbsn-localstreaming-service-to-expand-digital-reach/ [https://perma.cc/GWW5-6QRE].
42. Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5 (2000).
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how a tax should apply under specific facts.43 The doctrine permits courts to
ignore or controvert the text of tax codes in light of economic principles, the
taxpayer’s motivation, or a combination of both.44 While the doctrine’s
applicability may vary from court to court according to the type of transaction
in question, its use often favors the tax commissioner.45 The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner46 demonstrates the
doctrine in practice.
In that case, the taxpayer, PPL, challenged the IRS’s denial of tax credits
for its payment of windfall taxes in the United Kingdom.47 The Internal
Revenue Code provided for a tax credit on income taxes paid to a foreign
government,48 and the issue was whether the United Kingdom’s tax on
windfall profits was considered a foreign income tax for U.S. tax purposes.
The Court stressed the importance of putting aside labels and definitions to
assess the tax’s ultimate economic effect.49 Applying the substance-overform doctrine,50 the Court held that the tax operated as effectively an income
tax and thus the taxpayer was entitled to the tax credit.51 Thus, while these
sorts of tax labels may matter to state or local governments, the Court has
stressed the importance of looking beyond the labels to assess the true nature
and effect of a particular tax.
2. Deference to Tax Commissioner Rulings
Another tool of tax interpretation is the deference afforded to
administrative construction and interpretations of tax codes.52

43. Under this treatment, a court will look right through the label as if it did not exist. Cf.
JOHN C. REILLY, Mister Cellophane, on CHICAGO: MUSIC FROM THE MIRAMAX MOTION
PICTURE (Epic Records 2002). The root of this doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Gregory, the taxpayer
engaged in a series of actions for the sole purpose of paying certain taxes at a preferable tax
rate. Id. at 467. While the facts fit squarely within the letter of the law as set forth in the tax
code, the Supreme Court nonetheless ruled against the taxpayer because her conduct was
plainly outside the intent and purpose of the code in question. Id. at 470.
44. Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 701 (2003). The substance-over-form
doctrine is broad and encompasses other related doctrines, such as the sham transaction
doctrine and other recharacterization doctrines that are applied to cover different factual
scenarios. See id. at 722–36. For the purposes of this Note, the substance-over-form doctrine
will be used broadly as a singular umbrella doctrine rather than distinguishing among the
smaller subsets and variations of the doctrine.
45. See generally Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to
Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137 (1990).
46. 569 U.S. 329 (2013).
47. Id. at 331.
48. I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (2012).
49. PPL, 569 U.S. at 335.
50. Id. at 340–41 (“[W]e follow substance over form and recognize that the windfall tax
is nothing more than a tax on actual profits above a threshold.”).
51. Id. at 344.
52. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations,
3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996); Jasper L. Cummings Jr., The Supreme Court’s Deference to Tax
Administrative Interpretation, 69 TAX LAW. 419 (2016); Kristin E. Oglesby, Comment,
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Administrative deference is often justified as a matter of comparative
competence53 and political accountability.54 As administered, it is
effectively the court’s way of saying “I Can’t Do It Alone.”55 Others,
including Justice Gorsuch, denounce such deference as “judge-made doctrine
for the abdication of the judicial duty”56 and argue for its curtailment in light
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.57 Regardless of one’s
views, a discussion of deference to federal administrative authorities begins
with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,58 which
set out the framework for modern deference,59 and its refinement in United
States v. Mead Corp.60
In Mead, the Supreme Court had to determine what deference, if any,
should apply to a U.S. Customs Service tariff classification.61 The central
issue became which level of deference to apply: (1) Chevron deference,
which the Court found affords a heightened deference to so-called
“legislative” rulings;62 or (2) Skidmore deference,63 a lesser deference that
varies based on a variety of factors, which the Court ultimately applied to
“interpretive” rulings.64 While the legislative-interpretive dichotomy is
central to the Mead deference analysis, such a distinction may not be as
pertinent in tax cases.65 The muddiness of the distinction arises largely from
a 2011 Supreme Court tax case, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States.66 There, the Court dealt with a rule promulgated
by the Treasury Department and ultimately addressed whether Chevron
deference would apply based solely upon ambiguity in the statute rather than
any legislative-interpretive ruling distinction.67
Granting Chevron Deference to IRS Revenue Rulings: The “Charitable” Thing to Do, 78 LA.
L. REV. 631 (2017).
53. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
54. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response
to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 397 (1987).
55. See CATHERINE ZETA-JONES, I Can’t Do It Alone, on CHICAGO: MUSIC FROM THE
MIRAMAX MOTION PICTURE (Epic Records 2002).
56. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
57. Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 552 (2018).
58. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
59. Oglesby, supra note 52, at 637.
60. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
61. Id. at 221.
62. Legislative rulings are afforded heightened deference “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” Id. at 226–27.
63. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
64. These factors include the administration’s thoroughness, the validity of its reasoning,
the consistency of its interpretation over time, and other powers of persuasion. Mead, 533 U.S.
at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40).
65. See Cummings, supra note 52, at 421.
66. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
67. See generally id.
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More importantly, the Court’s holding in Mayo put tax cases on par with
other administrative cases and stressed that in complex areas such as tax,
agencies “must be able to exercise [their] authority to meet changing
conditions and new problems.”68 To do so, the Court set aside the oft-cited
analysis set forth in National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States,69 which
provided for limited deference in tax cases after satisfying a complex
multistep framework.70 Thus in the federal tax context, the net effect of
Mayo collapses these varying deference tests into one sliding-scale approach
based upon the facts and circumstances,71 sometimes without even resorting
to Chevron.72
At the state and local levels, construction and interpretation of tax laws by
tax agencies are similarly afforded a sliding scale of deference, unless
inconsistent with their other interpretations or contrary to statutory intent.73
However, this deference is not absolute: questions of constitutionality extend
beyond the scope of a tax authority’s expertise and are thus not entitled to
deference by courts.74
C. Principles of Local Taxation
Before the previously discussed tools of interpretation can be applied, an
actual tax must be implemented. Local governments have a multitude of
taxing options to collect revenue from video streaming services. These
include the sales and use tax, the amusement tax, and the utility or
telecommunications excise tax.75 One additional option, while not explicitly
a tax, is a provider fee. Each of these regimes will be considered in turn.76
A sales tax is a consumption tax on goods or services, typically levied at
the point of sale as a percentage of the purchase price.77 A seller typically
collects and then remits sales taxes to the taxing jurisdiction.78 Sales taxes
68. Id. at 56 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983)).
69. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
70. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 53–57.
71. Cummings, supra note 52, at 423.
72. Id.
73. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 233 (2018).
74. See, e.g., Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 905 (Ohio 2016); Zissi v. State
Tax Comm’n, 842 P.2d 848, 853 n.2 (Utah 1992).
75. This Note refers to both “taxes” and “tax bases.” A tax base includes every activity
subject to the tax. Tax Base, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A tax base may be
expanded without changing the tax law itself. For example, when Chicago’s amusement tax
was held to apply to video streaming services, the amusement tax base grew as more activity
was covered by the tax. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
76. There are other taxes which may be applied to video streaming services, such as the
property tax and the corporate tax. See M. DAVID GELFAND ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 44–61 (3d ed. 2007). This Note, however, focuses
solely on consumption taxes, where users ultimately pay the tax directly or indirectly.
77. Id. at 65–66. Sales taxes are levied in all but five states: Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Oregon. See JARED WALCZAK & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATE
AND LOCAL SALES TAX RATES IN 2017, at 2 (2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/
20170131121743/TaxFoundation-FF539.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4W9-UC5Z]. Alaska and
Montana do not levy sales taxes, but their municipalities may. See id.
78. See GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 66–67.
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are typically lumped together with use taxes, which are levied at the same
rate, because use taxes operate effectively as a proxy for the sales tax on
purchases made outside of a consumer’s jurisdiction of residence.79 The use
tax applies to goods or services that are purchased outside the taxing
jurisdiction but stored or consumed within it.80 Use taxes are due within the
taxing jurisdiction if the purchase would have been subject to sales tax if
purchased there and if sales tax was not collected where the purchase was
made.81 To illustrate, take a resident of Dallas who purchases a car in
Cleveland for storage and use in Dallas. If Cleveland did not collect sales
tax on the purchase, but Dallas would have, then the resident owes use tax in
Dallas.
The liability for these taxes typically falls on the consumer, who is
ultimately liable if the seller does not collect a sales tax on the transaction.82
However, whether or not a seller is required to collect taxes is a separate
question. If a sale occurs in a jurisdiction which levies a sales tax on a
particular good or service, the provider of the good or service must collect
and remit the sales tax to the jurisdiction only if it established a substantial
nexus with the taxing jurisdiction.83
The amusement tax is effectively a specialized sales tax on admission to
places of entertainment and is levied as a percentage of the admission price,
often at the same rate as the jurisdiction’s sales tax.84 While calculated in
the same manner as a sales tax, the amusement tax forms an independent tax
base.85 Given its specialized nature, the amusement tax faces a lesser
procedural burden than the general sales tax: while a local government’s
sales tax often requires specific state legislative authorization, an amusement
tax typically does not.86 However, while most cities have a sales tax, fewer
have an amusement tax, and even those cities that do differ in what qualifies
as a taxable amusement. For example, while Philadelphia and Santa Cruz
79. Id. at 80–81. But see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (positing
that while sales and use taxes often “bring about the same result,” they are conceptually
different and may require different constitutional justifications).
80. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 80–81.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 67, 81; see also I Bought a Taxable Item and the Seller Didn’t Charge Sales
Tax. Do I Have to Pay the Tax Anyway?, SALES TAX INST., https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/
sales_tax_faqs/i-bought-a-taxable-item-and-the-seller-didnt-charge-sales-tax-do-i-have-topay-the-tax-anyway [https://perma.cc/G3KF-2RY9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
83. How Do I Know if I Should Be Collecting Tax in a State?, SALES TAX INST.,
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/Sales_Tax_FAQs/should_I_collect_tax [https://perma.cc/
UF97-KPA5] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). For a discussion of what constitutes a substantial
nexus for the purposes of internet taxation, see infra Part II.C.2.
84. Amusement Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also GELFAND ET
AL., supra note 76, at 91.
85. As such, it has been suggested that the amusement tax may skirt the confines of the
substantial-nexus requirement. See, e.g., William L. Fletcher Jr., Note, Netflix and Quill:
Using Access and Consumption to Create a Plan for Taxing the Cloud, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1029, 1031 n.3 (2017); infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the substantial-nexus requirement in
detail).
86. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 91. The amusement tax also may avoid a vote of
local residents. Id.
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tax admissions to movie theaters, New York City exempts them from its
amusement tax.87
The excise tax is related to the sales tax, as it operates effectively as a
specialized sales tax on particular goods or services.88 However, the excise
tax differs from the general sales tax in three important ways. First, the
provider of a good or service is responsible for paying the excise tax.89 While
consumers are mostly unaware of the tax, providers often pass the cost onto
the consumer by including it in the price.90 However, the provider remains
ultimately liable.91 Second, the excise tax is highly specific and traditionally
applies only to transactions that have high social costs, such as gasoline,
cigarettes, and alcohol.92 Third, excise taxes tend to be levied as flat taxes
assessed on a flat or per-unit basis rather than as a percentage rate applied to
a transaction.93 For example, New York State levies a roughly four dollar
tax on a pack of cigarettes, which remains constant whether the price
increases or decreases.94
The dividing line between excise and sales taxes may sometimes be
blurred because the last two distinguishing characteristics do not always
exist. The excise tax sometimes applies to goods or services that do not
necessarily have high social costs and may apply on a percentage basis, as is
the case with taxes on utilities such as telecommunications services.95
An additional quasi-tax option is the fee, which operates effectively as a
narrowly tailored tax that covers the costs of a specific government program
or service.96 Local governments often prefer fees to taxes for various
87. Compare Amusement Tax, CITY PHILA. https://www.phila.gov/services/paymentsassistance-taxes/business-taxes/amusement-tax/ [https://perma.cc/R3W5-3UAC] (last visited
Feb. 12, 2019), and Admission Tax, CITY SANTA CRUZ, http://www.cityofsantacruz.com/
government/city-departments/finance/licenses-fees-and-taxes/admission-tax [http://perma.cc/
Z2PC-QDPN] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019), with N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
TB-ST-8, ADMISSION CHARGES TO A PLACE OF AMUSEMENT 2 (2014), https://www.tax.ny.gov/
pdf/tg_bulletins/sales/b14_8s.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE25-3XLX]. New York City follows
New York State’s tax policy on amusement. See New York State Sales and Use Tax,
N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/business-nys-sales-tax.page
[http://perma.cc/Q5H8-7FHF] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
88. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 85.
89. See Dan Caplinger, What Is Excise Tax, and Do I Have to Pay It?, MOTLEY FOOL
(Dec. 17, 2016), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2016/12/17/what-is-excise-tax-and-do-ihave-to-pay-it.aspx [https://perma.cc/WP2S-74Z6].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Public Utility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A company that
provides necessary services to the public, such as telephone lines and service, electricity, and
water. Most utilities operate as monopolies but are subject to governmental regulation.”). For
example, New York State imposes an excise tax on telecommunications services at a rate of
2.5 percent. N.Y. TAX LAW § 186-e(2)(a)(1) (2019).
96. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 98–100; see also Rebecca Helmes, Extras on
Excise: The Difference Between a ‘Tax’ and ‘Fee’ and Why It Matters, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.bna.com/extras-excise-difference-b17179894455/
[https://perma.cc/P9BK-UYP7].
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reasons. First, fees are easier to pass and amend from a procedural standpoint
because they are not usually subject to voter approval or supermajority
requirements.97 Second, fees are subject to a lesser level of constitutional
review because they are designed to cover the government’s costs of
providing specific services under its regulatory powers, not to raise revenue
under commerce powers.98 As such, a fee need not meet the constitutional
substantial-nexus requirement imposed on taxes.99 Third, fees are often
considered more palatable than taxes because of their restitutionary nature.100
Thus, whether a charge constitutes a fee or a tax is murky but of great
significance to local governments.
For example, in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson,101 the Fourth Circuit held that
North Carolina’s franchise charges levied on cable providers constituted
taxes as opposed to fees.102 In assessing whether the government-imposed
charge was a tax or a fee, the court looked at three factors: (1) who imposed
the charge, (2) who is subject to the charge, and (3) how the collected monies
are used.103 When the charge falls roughly between a fee and a tax, the court
held that the primary factor is how the money is used.104 In that case, all
three factors favored classification as a tax because the charges were not
imposed by administrative or regulatory agencies, the charges were not
narrowly targeted at certain users or providers, and the monies raised were
not discretely used to cover the costs of the specific government service for
which they were levied.105
II. ACT TWO: LOCAL TAXATION OF VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES:
CURRENT APPROACHES AND CONSTRAINTS
There is a growing disparity between the methods by which local
governments tax video streaming services, if they do so at all. In general,
these various tax schemes fit roughly into two categories: (1) those that tax
video streaming services independently from MVPDs, and (2) those that tax
them in line with MVPDs. Part II.A considers the former, while Part II.B
considers the latter. Part II.C concludes with an analysis of the “macro”
constraints that may inhibit local cities from taxing local video streaming
services, including constraints created by the states, the Supreme Court, and
Congress.

97. See Helmes, supra note 96.
98. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2008). The fee-tax
distinction is critical for constitutional review. Taxes, unlike fees, are subject to rigorous
constitutional review in light of dormant Commerce Clause concerns. See infra Part II.C.2.
99. See infra Part II.C.2.
100. See David Segal, Cities Turn to Fees to Fill Budget Gaps, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/business/11fees.html [https://perma.cc/2HEU-H56N].
101. 513 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2008).
102. Id. at 125.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 125–26.
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A. Tax Approaches That Are Distinct from MVPD Taxation
As discussed in Part I.C, local governments have various taxing
approaches available to them. This Part considers two particular case studies
where video streaming services are taxed independently of MVPDs:
(1) Pennsylvania’s sales and use tax, and (2) Chicago’s amusement tax.
1. Pennsylvania’s Sales and Use Tax
In 2016, Pennsylvania modernized its tax code to extend the state’s
6 percent sales and use tax to “digital products delivered to a customer
electronically, digitally or by streaming.”106 The Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue specifically states that these digital products include TVODs107
and SVODs.108 The seller must collect and remit the tax if the consumer’s
billing address is in Pennsylvania, irrespective of where the actual video is
viewed.109 While noteworthy within the state, this sort of tax is far from
revolutionary, with calls for such modernization dating back to 2013110 and
similar implementation, for example, taking place in Washington State in
2009.111
The approach, however, is not without its drawbacks. One issue is that
many local governments exempt services from their sales tax largely due to
historical accident.112 When sales taxes were first implemented during the
Great Depression, the economy was largely goods-based.113 Currently,
many statutes still exempt services because they fall outside these taxing
statutes, which are difficult to amend from a political perspective given fears
of regressivity.114 Some states attempt to circumvent this issue by treating
video streaming services as if they were digital goods rather than services,
though only twenty-seven states taxed digital goods as of December 1,
2017.115 That group is actually even smaller because several of these states

106. Digital Products, PA. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.revenue.pa.gov/General
TaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Information/SUT/Pages/Digital-Products.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R6F3-QR6X] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
107. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
109. Digital Products, supra note 106.
110. See generally MICHAEL LEACHMAN & MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, FOUR STEPS TO MOVING STATE SALES TAXES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY (2013),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-9-13sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z7DW9HA].
111. Digital Products Including Digital Goods, WASH. DEP’T REVENUE (May 19, 2009),
https://dor.wa.gov/get-form-or-publication/publications-subject/tax-topics/digital-productsincluding-digital-goods [https://perma.cc/P8SB-QFZM].
112. NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., SALES TAX BASE BROADENING: RIGHT-SIZING A
STATE SALES TAX 6 (2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171026101536/Tax-FoundationFF563.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D67-555K].
113. See id. at 3.
114. See id. at 6.
115. See 2018 STATE TAX HANDBOOK 852–54 (Cathleen Calhoun et al. eds., 2017).
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tax only permanent digital video downloads and specifically exempt video
streaming services.116
2. Chicago’s Amusement Tax
The City of Chicago took a different approach by levying an amusement
tax on video streaming services, which it accomplished through a revenue
ruling on a previously enacted municipal amusement tax.117 The term
“amusement” is construed broadly to encompass a wide range of activities.118
For example, the statute includes, but is not limited to, theatrical
performances, motion pictures, circuses, carnivals, and athletic events.119
While the tax is imposed upon the “patrons of every amusement within the
City,” providers are jointly and severally liable for the tax imposed.120
Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, through his spokesperson Elizabeth
Langsdorf, argued that “[i]n an environment in which technologies and
emerging industries evolve quickly, the City periodically issues rulings that
clarify the application of existing laws to these technologies and
industries.”121 Beyond providing clearer guidance, such a ruling, according
to Alderman Ameya Pawar, would promote fairness by correcting the tax
loophole that allowed online businesses to skirt the tax code to better
“reflect[] the realities of the marketplace.”122
Accordingly, on June 9, 2015, Chicago’s Comptroller issued Amusement
Tax Ruling #5, which interpreted Chicago’s amusement tax to include
“charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements
that are delivered electronically.”123 More specifically, the ruling expands
the amusement tax to cover charges for video streaming services provided to

116. Compare Digital Products, supra note 106 (including video streaming in the
Pennsylvania digital goods tax), and Digital Products Including Digital Goods, supra note
111 (including video streaming in the Washington digital goods tax), with IDAHO CODE § 633616(b) (2018) (excluding video streaming from the Idaho digital goods tax), and IND. CODE
§ 6-2.5-4-16.4 (2018) (excluding video streaming from the Indiana digital goods tax).
117. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020 (2018) (imposing a 9 percent tax on “the
admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, to witness, to view or to
participate in such amusement”).
118. In the tax commissioner’s interpretive ruling, the broadness is underscored by adding
emphasis to highlight that “amusement” includes “any exhibition, performance, presentation
or show for entertainment purposes . . . any entertainment or recreational activity offered for
public participation or on a membership or other basis . . . or . . . any paid television
programming.” City of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., Amusement Tax Ruling #5 para. 2 (June 9, 2015)
(quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020).
119. Id.
120. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-156-020 to -030(A).
121. John Byrne & Amina Elahi, Chicago Extends Taxing Power to Online Movies, Music,
More, CHI. TRIB. (July 5, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctchicago-cloud-tax-met-0702-20150701-story.html [https://perma.cc/944R-MB6A].
122. Id.
123. City of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., Amusement Tax Ruling #5 para. 8 (June 9, 2015) (emphasis
added).
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Chicago consumers as determined by their primary residential or business
address.124
Responding to this ruling, the Liberty Justice Center, a libertarian think
tank, challenged the extension of the amusement tax on behalf of a group of
Chicago internet consumers in Labell. The plaintiffs focused on three
grounds: (1) a violation of the ITFA, (2) a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, and (3) a violation of the city’s power under Illinois’s
home-rule provision.125
First, as to the ITFA issue,126 the plaintiffs challenged the new
interpretation of the amusement tax as discriminatory.127 In their view, the
tax was discriminatory because similar noninternet entertainment was subject
to unequal taxation, including flat yearly taxes on automatic amusement
machines and lower rates for live performances in small venues.128 The court
disagreed and found real and substantial differences between in-person
entertainment and streaming entertainment and, thus, found no violation of
the ITFA.129
Second, as to the dormant Commerce Clause issue,130 the plaintiffs
challenged the tax’s application to streaming services used outside of
Chicago because they lacked a substantial nexus to the City and were unfairly
apportioned.131 The court again disagreed on both accounts.132 First, the
court found that the tax did possess a substantial nexus to Chicago because it
applied only to those who receive their streaming services in Chicago based
upon a “fair assumption that the taxpayers’ residence will be their primary
places of streaming.”133 Second, the court found that it was fairly
apportioned and externally consistent based on this same assumption: using
the customer’s billing address as the basis for taxation is a “practical solution
to the technology of the 21st century,”134 and the limited possibility of
multiple taxation was insufficient to invalidate the tax ruling.135

124. Id. paras. 8(a), 13. The tax does not apply to permanent digital sales of TV or movies,
which are treated separately under the general sales tax base. Id. paras. 10–11.
125. Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 15 CH 13399, 2018 BL 212206, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May
24, 2018). The plaintiffs also challenged the extension as a violation of the Illinois state
constitution, but this Note does not address that portion. Id.
126. See infra Part II.C.3.
127. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *2.
128. Id. at *2–3.
129. Id. The court distinguished video streaming on one’s personal device as “not in any
way similar” to live performances, which foster tourism and business and cultivate the fine
arts. Id. at *3. The court then distinguished video streaming from automatic amusement
machines, which are operated on a coin-per-use basis on shared devices owned by an
establishment and to which per-transaction taxation would be administratively inconvenient.
Id.
130. See infra Part II.C.2.
131. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *4.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. at *5–6.
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Third, as to the home-rule issue,136 the plaintiffs claimed that Chicago
exceeded its home-rule powers by taxing streaming services beyond its
borders and therefore beyond the scope of its taxing authority.137 The court
yet again disagreed, siding with the City on various grounds. First, the court
reasoned that the state’s home-rule powers are to be construed liberally to
give municipalities, such as Chicago, wide latitude to tax absent an express
state legislative statement to the contrary.138 Second, the court found even
greater support for such taxing power given that Illinois adopted the Mobile
Telecommunications Sourcing Act (MTSA).139 Passed by Congress in 2002,
the MTSA enables state and local taxation of mobile telecommunications
services at the customer’s “place of primary use” regardless of where the
services are actually used.140 While the MTSA is silent with respect to
streaming services provided by non-telecommunications companies, the
court found that using a customer’s billing address as the basis of the tax was
reasonable because the MTSA would permit it if the streaming services were
instead provided by telecommunications companies.141 Lastly, the court
reiterated that municipal ordinances such as this are presumed constitutional
and will be upheld absent a successful facial or as-applied challenge.142 In
sum, the court likened the tax to the Chicago vehicle sticker tax, which is
based upon the driver’s billing address even if the vehicle is driven outside
of the city.143 Likewise, a streaming service consumer who lives in Chicago
is liable for the tax even if the streaming takes place outside of the city.144
Though Chicago prevailed on summary judgment, Amusement Tax
Ruling #5 is far from settled law. On the one hand, a similar challenge
brought by the Entertainment Software Association was voluntarily
dismissed, which suggests that challengers may be conceding the validity of
Labell’s reasoning.145 On the other, Labell is on appeal146 and Apple has
filed a similar lawsuit against Chicago on the same three grounds.147 For

136. A home-rule provision is a state legislature’s conditional allocation of autonomy to a
local government. Home Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also infra Part
II.C.1.
137. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *8.
138. Id. at *9–10; see also ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a), (m); Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive
Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2013).
139. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *9–10.
140. Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 117(b), 124(8) (2012).
141. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *10.
142. Id. at *11 (citing City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., 865 N.E.2d 133, 146 (Ill.
2006)).
143. Id. at *12.
144. Id.
145. Michael J. Bologna, Chicago’s ‘Netflix Tax’ OK, but Appeal in Queue, BLOOMBERG
BNA (May 29, 2018), https://www.bna.com/chicagos-netflix-tax-n57982093026/
[https://perma.cc/86ZJ-T37G].
146. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Apple Complaint, supra note 9. The complaint notably differs from the
one filed in Labell as it comes from the perspective of an out-of-state provider rather than that
of a consumer subject to the tax. The complaint highlights the “significant administrative
burden” of the amusement tax’s collection and remission and the unfairness of being held
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now, the amusement tax remains in effect and all remote sellers are
responsible for collecting and remitting as of October 1, 2018.148
B. Tax Approaches That Are Consistent with MVPD Taxation
Another approach taken by local governments is to tax video streaming
services in line with how MVPDs are taxed. As discussed in Part I.A, video
streaming services and MVPDs compete with each other.149 Whether video
streaming services fall into the category of MVPDs may have massive tax
implications—telecommunications services, such as MVPDs, are the most
heavily transaction-taxed services in the United States, subject to roughly 14
percent taxes on average as opposed to the 6 percent average for other
services.150
Recognizing the convergence of video streaming services and MVPDs,151
in 2015 the FCC proposed a rule that would have redefined MVPDs to
include at least some video streaming services, which would make these
approaches easier.152 The agency justified this proposal as a modernization
of its regulations to (1) recognize the trend of video services increasingly
accessed on the internet, and (2) benefit consumers by stimulating innovation
and competition.153 The FCC’s current chair, Ajit Pai, served as a
commissioner when the change was proposed154 and expressed his
opposition on multiple occasions—gently at first,155 and then more sharply
by cautioning against opening a Pandora’s box of video streaming

directly liable for Chicago residents’ tax liability if it fails to collect and remit the taxes
accordingly. Id. paras. 38–40.
148. See Tripp Baltz, State of Wayfair: Illinois ‘Amorphous,’ Attempting to Streamline,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/state-wayfair-illinois-n730144
82728/ [https://perma.cc/4SPQ-WMTH].
149. See supra Part I.A.
150. JOE CARR ET AL., DELOITTE, UNDERSTANDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAXATION 8–9
(2015),
https://telestrategies.com/tax/Presentations2015/Wednesday/Deloitte%20101%20
PAPER%20May-15_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDR4-Z4ZW].
See generally Note,
Taxation of Cable Television: First Amendment Limitations, 109 HARV. L. REV. 440 (1995)
(discussing the differential taxation of cable television and its resulting greater tax burden to
consumers).
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. This would be done “by including [within the FCC definition of MVPDs] services that
make available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple linear streams of video
programming, regardless of the technology used to distribute the programming.” Promoting
Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming
Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078 (proposed Jan. 15, 2015).
153. Id. at 2079.
154. Ajit Pai: FCC Chairman, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/about/
leadership/ajit-pai [https://perma.cc/WG24-8CM9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
155. “[G]iven the dramatic, organic explosion in online video content over the last few
years, I have my doubts as to whether additional regulation in this space is necessary.” Ajit
Pai, Comm’r, FCC, Concurring Statement on Promoting Innovation and Competition in the
Provision of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001010395.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4JZ-X4KA].
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regulation.156 Accordingly, the change never occurred and thus video
streaming services remain unregulated as distinct from their MVPD peers.157
Nevertheless, as a matter of apparent equity, or of convenience,
governments continue to attempt such taxation, and while these regulatory
issues may seem distinct from the tax considerations at the core of this Note,
the differing regulatory treatment does have relevant downstream effects on
such attempts. By maintaining such definitional distinctions, state and local
governments that seek to conveniently tax video streaming services in line
with existing MVPD tax laws might not be able to do so.158
For example, in Netflix, Inc. v. Finance & Administration Cabinet
Department of Revenue, Netflix sought to avoid paying Kentucky state taxes
by relying upon the FCC’s definitions to distinguish it from classification as
an MVPD or cable service under the state’s telecommunications tax.159 The
court noted that “[w]hen a Kentucky statute is modeled after a federal
counterpart statute, the Kentucky courts state that they ‘must consider the
way the federal act has been interpreted.’”160 The core of Netflix’s argument
was the distinct treatment of video streaming services apart from MVPDs
under FCC regulations, which suggests that these federal definitions still
matter greatly even as applied to state or local tax statutes.161
Of course, state and local governments could circumvent the issue by
altering the definitions of MVPDs in their respective telecommunications
statutes, though they have had varied success in doing so. While states such
as Florida162 and South Carolina163 have successfully subjected video
streaming services to their telecommunications taxes, other attempts have
floundered, become the subject of ongoing litigation, or been abandoned.
Netflix illustrates one such failed attempt. The Kentucky legislature
defined MVPDs more broadly than the FCC’s definition,164 and the court
156. Ajit Pai, Comm’r, FCC, Remarks Before the Churchill Club (July 17, 2015),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-334437A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SRD-G577].
157. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
159. Netflix, Inc. v. Fin. & Admin. Cabinet Dep’t of Revenue, No. K-24900, 2015 WL
5692791, at *1–2 (Ky. B.T.A. Sept. 23, 2015).
160. Id. at *2 (quoting Harker v. Fed. Land Bank, 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1984)).
161. Id.
162. “‘Video service’ means the transmission of video, audio, or other programming
service to a purchaser, and . . . includes . . . digital video.” FLA. STAT. § 14-202.11(24) (2018).
This is in stark contrast to Florida’s earlier definition of “video services” which explicitly
exempted video streaming services from telecommunications tax treatment. FLA. STAT. § 36610.103(11) (2018) (stating that a video service does not include “video programming
provided as part of and via a service that enables end users to access content, information,
electronic mail, or other services offered over the public Internet”).
163. “The streaming transmission of television programs, movies and music using the
Internet is no different from cable and satellite transmission of television programs, movies
music, and other similar content, all of which are taxable communications services.” S.C.
Dep’t of Revenue, S.C. Revenue Ruling #16-5, at 5 (July 6, 2016) (interpreting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-36-910(B)(3)).
164. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. Kentucky, on the other hand, defines
an MVPD as “programming provided by or generally considered comparable to programming
provided by a television broadcast station and shall include but not be limited to: (a) Cable
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was thus faced with a taxation statute similar to, but distinct from, the FCC’s
definition.165 The court reasoned that even if Netflix would avoid state
taxation under the FCC definition of an MVPD, it could still be taxed under
the Kentucky statute’s definition if it so provided.166 The court compared
the statutory language to that of Florida’s communications tax,167 where the
statute explicitly covers digital video streaming. Absent such clear language
in the statute, the court instead had to determine whether a video streaming
service such as Netflix was generally comparable to a MVPD.168 While the
court noted that both provide video content to consumers, a video streaming
service is effectively comparable only to the on-demand portion of an
MVPD, which was insufficient to render it generally comparable on the
whole.169 Rather, the court found them to be quite different, since video
streaming services do not provide live programming or scheduled linear
programming.170 Because Netflix did not fit within the letter of the law and
was not generally comparable to MVPDs, the court held it was not subject to
the tax.171
Various municipalities across Missouri are currently entangled in litigation
regarding their attempts to charge video streaming services as MVPDs, albeit
through a provider fee rather than through a tax.172 In 2007, Missouri passed
the Video Services Providers Act (VSPA), which paved the way for
municipalities to collect fees from providers of video services.173 Pursuant
to this statute, municipalities such as Creve Coeur have collected 5 percent
fees from cable providers and the like, and have since sought a declaratory
judgment that video streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu are subject
to this same fee.174 The class action lawsuit, brought on behalf of all
similarly situated municipalities in Missouri, alleges that Netflix fits within
the VSPA’s definition of a video service provider175 because its video
content is delivered over broadband internet connection, a public right-ofway, within the state.176 Netflix argues that it is not generally comparable to
service; (b) Satellite broadcast and wireless cable service; and (c) Internet protocol television
provided through wireline facilities without regard to delivery technology.” KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 136.602(8) (West 2018).
165. Netflix, 2015 WL 5692791, at *1.
166. “The Board concludes that if [video] streaming services fit within the Kentucky
statute’s definition for ‘multichannel video programming,’ then Netflix would be a provider
of ‘multichannel video programming services’ for purposes of Kentucky tax law, regardless
of its status under federal law for regulatory purposes.” Id. at *3.
167. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
168. Netflix, 2015 WL 5692791, at *3.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *3–4.
171. Id. at *6.
172. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text.
173. MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2689 (2018).
174. See generally Creve Coeur Petition, supra note 9.
175. Video services are defined as “the provision of video programming provided through
wireline facilities located at least in part in the public right-of-way without regard to delivery
technology, including internet protocol technology whether provided as part of a tier, on
demand, or a per-channel basis.” MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2677(14) (2018).
176. Creve Coeur Petition, supra note 9, para. 35.
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those providers subject to the fee, relying on both the Kentucky Netflix
case177 and federal telecommunications law.178 The case remains undecided
as of the publication of this Note.
Other attempts, while not the subject of litigation, have been sharply
criticized and abandoned. Across California, Pasadena and forty-five other
cities have considered issuing interpretive rulings to include video streaming
services in their utility tax bases.179 This would make these services, like
their MVPD counterparts, subject to taxes ranging anywhere from 4 to 10
percent.180 While smaller municipalities did so, Pasadena suspended their
efforts following substantial pushback from certain lawmakers.181
C. Key Constraints on Local Taxation
This Part outlines the potential roadblocks to the local taxation of video
streaming services posed by the states, the Supreme Court, and Congress.
Part II.C.1 describes home-rule provisions and state restrictions on local tax
discretion. Part II.C.2 discusses the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and how it impacts internet taxation. Part II.C.3 then
addresses congressional limitations on internet taxation as provided for in the
ITFA.
1. The States: Home-Rule Provisions
Even if a city wanted to tax video streaming services as discussed in Part
II.A and Part II.B, cities “often lack the legal authority to enact meaningful
tax reform.”182 Because cities are technically “creatures of the state,” their
powers are typically constrained by what a state will allow, which varies from
state to state.183 Many states have responded by enacting home-rule
provisions as a means of devolution to allow cities greater authority to tackle
certain problems.184 While a number of states explicitly give their local
177. See supra notes 159–71 and accompanying text.
178. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Netflix, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 8–9, City of Creve Coeur v. Netflix, No. 4:18-cv-01495
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2018), ECF No. 10 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 522(20)).
179. Utility taxes are merely excise taxes on utilities. See supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
180. Jason Henry, Pasadena Will Tax Netflix, Hulu and Your City Might Be Next,
PASADENA STAR-NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.pasadenastarnews.com/2016/
09/23/pasadena-will-tax-netflix-hulu-and-your-city-might-be-next/ [https://perma.cc/MK4SUN6T].
181. MICHAEL J. CATALDO, PILLSBURY, CALIFORNIA CITIES TO TAX STREAMING VIDEO? 3
n.9 (2016), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/1/0/v2/104731/AlertDec2016Tax
UtilityUserTaxonStreamingVideo.pdf [https://perma.cc/A43X-ZMUL]; see also Janko
Roettgers, California Bill Aims to Stop Local Netflix Tax Ordinances, VARIETY
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/netflix-tax-stream-act-1201984291/
[https://perma.cc/M38M-EPJB].
182. Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296 (2016).
183. Id. at 301.
184. Id. at 302. Types of home-rule authority include structural, personnel, functional, and
fiscal, according to the National League of Cities. Id. at 301–02.
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governments fiscal control, including tax discretion, these local governments
may still be constrained by state constitutional provisions.185
Home-rule provisions vary widely depending upon how much deference a
state is willing to offer its localities. For example, one recent article
compared home-rule provisions from three states—Washington, Wisconsin,
and Ohio—to demonstrate the disparity among home-rule provisions.186
While Washington and Wisconsin offer limited taxing power to their local
governments, Ohio offers its local governments general presumptive taxing
authority.187 Whether or not local governments should be given greater
leeway to experiment with taxation is a contested question with principled
justifications on both sides of the debate.188
Proponents of greater local tax discretion cite multiple reasons, principally
the potential for greater policy innovation at the local level.189 Confronted
with declining revenues and limited state aid, greater tax innovation at the
local level would discourage municipal borrowing and empower local
leaders to raise sufficient funds to meet their spending needs.190 Moreover,
local governments are uniquely situated to serve as laboratories of democracy
where the stakes are comparatively lower than they are at the state or federal
level.191 In the context of such a multitude of localities—over 3000 counties
and 15,000 municipalities—greater tax discretion would allow seemingly
endless “opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and reform.”192
In fact, several now-national fiscal policy proposals were incubated at the
local level, such as the Fight for $15 movement to address issues of lowwage work.193 After just five local governments had minimum wage laws in
place in 2012, more than forty local governments joined the Fight for $15
movement and implemented such laws as of June 2018.194 The Fight for $15
185. Id. at 302–03.
186. Id. at 305–13.
187. Id. at 312.
188. See id. at 316–34. As a proponent of expanded home-rule authority, Scharff calls for
presumptive municipal taxing authority. Id. at 298.
189. Id. at 316–17. Other reasons include less distortion of city-development choices,
greater lines of accountability, and increased regulatory choices. Id. at 312.
190. Id. at 316–17.
191. Id. at 316.
192. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259
(2004).
193. See Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers into the Middle Class,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/fifteendollars-minimum-wage/401540/ [https://perma.cc/B9EL-NRYL] (discussing the history of
the Fight for $15 movement).
194. Inventory of US City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances, U.C. BERKELEY LAB.
CTR. (June 20, 2018), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/
inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/ [https://perma.cc/U3S6-ZLP9].
These changes have upstream effects on states as well. Take California for example. After
cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco experimented with fiscal policy and raised their
local minimum wages to fifteen dollars, the State of California followed shortly thereafter and
pledged to raise the state’s minimum wage to fifteen dollars as well. The state wage increases
trail those at the local level and allow the state to maneuver away from the policy should the
effects at the local level be suboptimal. See Paul Davidson, California Reaches Deal on $15
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has since continued up the state level to become a centerpiece of the
Democrats’ national fiscal platform.195 This bottom-up policy building is
not a strange phenomenon by any stretch, as there are countless other
examples, including the national drinking age, the national speed limit, and
Common Core educational standards.196
However, not everyone agrees that local governments should be given
greater tax discretion. From the states’ perspective, tight fiscal control over
localities may help mitigate vertical tax competition, horizontal tax
competition, concerns of ultimate fiscal responsibility, and administrability
concerns.197 Vertical tax competition is a concern for states because
municipal taxation may compete directly with the state’s taxation.198
Horizontal tax competition is also a concern for states because intrastate
competition between municipalities may set off a race for the lowest taxes.199
This would hurt, rather than help, municipalities and could potentially force
them to cut spending or increase their dependence on state aid.200 A third
concern that states may have relates to the perception that they bear ultimate
fiscal responsibility: state leaders fear that local fiscal distress might ripple
elsewhere, perhaps even upstream to the state level.201
The final concern relates to administrability and requires a deeper dive.202
While states themselves often lack sufficient resources to support their own
tax administration, local governments are even less sophisticated and have
even fewer resources.203 Thus, to protect multijurisdictional taxpayers and
create greater efficiencies, a state may be inclined to restrict local tax
Minimum Wage, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/
03/28/california-raises-minimum-wage-15-hour/82348622/ [https://perma.cc/ZSZ6-VHNX];
Annemarie Duran, California Minimum Wage Across Cities and Towns 2018 Guide for
Employers, SWIPECLOCK WORKFORCE MGMT. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www3.swipeclock.com/
blog/california-minimum-wage-across-cities-towns-2018-guide-employers/ [http://perma.cc/
GB9E-29UK].
195. Jordain Carney, Sanders, Democrats Introduce $15 Minimum Wage Bill, HILL (May
27, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/335227-sanders-democrats-introduce15-minimum-wage-bill [https://perma.cc/XTS7-6QDK]; see also Ivan Levingston, Sanders
Wins $15 Minimum Wage in Dems Platform Draft, CNBC (July 1, 2016, 6:19 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/01/sanders-wins-15-minimum-wage-in-dems-platformdraft.html [https://perma.cc/F2E9-4KXN].
196. Tom Loveless, When Does a Policy Start?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/when-does-a-policy-start/
[https://perma.cc/C4DMK4YN].
197. Scharff, supra note 182, at 321.
198. Id. at 321–22. While this may not be a problem where demand is inelastic, vertical
tax competition may create an issue where the demand is elastic. For example, assume a
municipality adds a tax on video streaming services, which are elastic. When consumers no
longer purchase them, they reduce not only the municipality’s tax revenue but the state’s,
assuming they tax the same service. Id.
199. Id. at 324–26. This horizontal competition can occur, for example, by offering tax
incentives to businesses to locate in a particular place or by offering lower sales tax rates to
residents. Id.
200. Id. at 326.
201. Id. at 326–30.
202. See id. at 330–34.
203. See id. at 331.
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discretion to minimize differences in tax rates and bases among
municipalities.204 Some states have gone even further by not only requiring
uniformity across local governments but by bringing themselves into
uniformity with other states through the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement (SSUTA).205
The SSUTA is a product of multistate cooperation to reduce tax
administration and compliance costs.206 Since its inception in 1999,207 the
SSUTA has grown to include twenty-four states and encompasses 33 percent
of the national population.208 The SSUTA is designed to make sales tax
administration easier through the use of more efficient administrative
procedures, novel technology, and simplification of sales tax laws.209 The
Supreme Court itself recently applauded the various taxpayer protections that
the SSUTA sets forth, including “a single, state level tax administration,
uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures,
and other uniform rules.”210 However, it remains unclear whether such
SSUTA protections are required to tax remote internet sellers without
violating the dormant Commerce Clause.211
As good as it sounds, not all states are on board with the SSUTA. Notable
exceptions include New York, California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and
Illinois.212 Perhaps uncoincidentally, these states house all ten of the nation’s
largest cities.213 Because the SSUTA requires uniformity across the state,
member states and their municipalities are stripped of flexibility in their tax
discretion. Take a nonmember state such as New York, which features a
complex web of sales and use taxes that vary by locality.214 Beyond mere
variation in county sales and use tax rates that are layered on top of the state’s
sales and use tax, the state allows for a wide variety of specific sales and

204. Id. at 331–32.
205. Id. at 333–34.
206. FAQs—General Information About Streamlined, STREAMLINED SALES TAX
GOVERNING BOARD, https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/Shared-Pages/faqs/faqs---aboutstreamlined#id [https://perma.cc/B2J3-EW84] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
207. Id.
208. The member states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
209. Id.
210. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018).
211. Hugh Goodwin, INSIGHT: ‘Quill’ Pickle? How ‘Wayfair’ Could Undermine Some
State Sales Tax Economic Nexus Provisions, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 26, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/insight-quill-pickle-n73014476911/ [https://perma.cc/2VS3-TFGW];
see infra Part II.C.2.
212. Baltz, supra note 148.
213. The 30 Most Populous Cities, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/the-30most-populous-cities [https://perma.cc/68RK-WW85] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
214. While the state sales and use tax rate is 4 percent, the counties apply additional county
sales and use taxes anywhere from 3 percent to 4.5 percent. See Derek Silva, All About New
York Sales Tax, SMARTASSET (Aug. 20, 2018), https://smartasset.com/taxes/new-york-salestax [https://perma.cc/BL96-CAUF].
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excise taxes in New York City.215 For example, New York City levies
special sales taxes on beauty-related services (such as those provided by
barbers, beauticians, and the like), health and fitness clubs, and
amusements.216 According to the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance, to comply with the SSUTA, such variations in tax rates, bases,
and inclusions would be impermissible.217 Thus, states that house large cities
with specialized, unique taxes may be less inclined to seek SSUTA
membership, in spite of any potential efficiencies for remote sellers.
2. The Supreme Court: The Dormant Commerce Clause
While states and local governments may impose taxes on sales within their
jurisdiction, doing so implicates Commerce Clause concerns.218 While the
Commerce Clause explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has further inferred a dormant Commerce
Clause to prohibit states from “impos[ing] regulations that place an undue
burden on interstate commerce.”219 Though principally applied as a
limitation upon the states, the dormant Commerce Clause applies to cities as
well.220 Because taxation of video streaming services may create such an
undue burden, the dormant Commerce Clause represents yet another
constraint on local governments attempting this sort of taxation.
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, for a tax law to be valid it must:
(1) be levied on “an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
[jurisdiction],” (2) be “fairly apportioned,” (3) “not discriminate against
interstate commerce,” and (4) be “fairly related to the services provided by
the [jurisdiction].”221 Of these elements, what constitutes a substantial nexus
has been the subject of much contention, including a number of controversies
that have made it to the Supreme Court.222
The first case to address this nexus requirement was National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue.223 The plaintiffs challenged Illinois’s attempt
to collect use taxes from a mail-order company whose in-state activity was
comprised solely of its shipping of catalogs and goods into the state through

215. New York State Sales and Use Tax, supra note 87.
216. Id.
217. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
STREAMLINING NEW YORK’S SALES TAX: EXAMINING REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH
THE STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT ii–iii (2006), https://www.tax.ny.gov/
pdf/stats/policy_special/streamlining_new_yorks_sales_tax_october_2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9H2-9KFK].
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress “to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
219. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579–80 (1995).
220. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-6 (3d ed. 2000).
221. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
222. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018); Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274; Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
223. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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a common carrier.224 The Supreme Court invalidated the tax because both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause require a physical
presence stronger than that between the mail-order company and Illinois.225
Ten years later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,226 the Supreme Court
explicitly enumerated the substantial-nexus requirement as part of its fourpart test.227 The first major refinement of what constitutes a substantial nexus
followed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp.228
In Quill, the Court dealt with essentially the same facts as in Bellas
Hess.229 This time around, however, the Court drew a sharper distinction
between the nexus required under the Due Process Clause as opposed to the
Commerce Clause.230 While the Due Process Clause requires purposeful
direction of activities at the taxing state, irrespective of a physical presence
in that state,231 the Court held that the Commerce Clause requires more
because the core constitutional concerns and policies are different.232 The
Court reaffirmed its holding in Bellas Hess and stressed a bright-line rule that
requires physical presence in the state to satisfy the substantial-nexus
requirement.233 While acknowledging that it tends to favor flexible
balancing tests, the Court doubled down on its bright-line rule because of the
supposed benefits both to the taxing state and taxpayers.234
In the final portion of the opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens invited
Congress to step in and act if it disagreed with restricting the states’ taxing
authority in this way.235 Congress never accepted his invitation to do so.
Professor Brian Galle of the Georgetown University Law Center suggested
that “Justice Stevens’s gambit was never likely to succeed” because of
Congress’s recent tendency to restrict rather than expand state taxing power
and decision paralysis with strong interest groups at play.236 Since Quill was
decided in 1992, the issue has only been exacerbated with the rise of powerful
internet retailers and the dominance of e-commerce, which unlike mail-order
companies actually have the “power to shutter whole industries.”237
224. Id. at 753–54.
225. Id. at 756, 760.
226. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
227. Id. at 279.
228. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
229. Id. at 301–04; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753–54.
230. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
231. Id. at 308.
232. Id. at 312–13 (articulating that while the Due Process analysis largely concerns itself
with notice and the “fundamental fairness of governmental activity,” the Commerce Clause
analysis is more focused on “structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the
national economy”).
233. Id. at 315.
234. These benefits include clear boundaries of authority that states can easily recognize as
well as settled expectations for companies about what sort of conduct does and does not
subject them to local taxation. Id. at 315–16.
235. Id. at 318–19.
236. See generally Brian Galle, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s
Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 158, 159
(2018).
237. Id. at 164.
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In response to this very point, Justice Anthony Kennedy fiercely criticized
the validity of Quill in his concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Ass’n v.
Brohl.238 Justice Kennedy highlighted “our increasingly interconnected
economy” as a result of the internet and online businesses’ widespread
growth.239 He further stressed the fundamental unfairness that results from
treating like things unlike for tax purposes and allowing local businesses to
remain subject to local taxation while their online competitors easily dodge
such tax obligations.240 Justice Kennedy called for an appropriate case for
the Court to reconsider its commitment to the physical-presence
requirement.241 In 2018, his call was answered.
In Wayfair, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the physicalpresence requirement after South Dakota sought a declaratory judgment that
would require online retailers to collect sales taxes in compliance with a
newly enacted state sales-tax law.242 Faced with the very inequity expressed
by Justice Kennedy in his Direct Marketing concurrence, South Dakota
passed a law that would bring out-of-state sellers in line with in-state sellers
“as if the seller had a physical presence in the state.”243 Notably, the law was
narrowly tailored and applied only to out-of-state sellers who conducted instate business above a dollar or transactional threshold while specifically
foreclosing any retroactive application.244 After the South Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the respondents, a group of
out-of-state businesses that would be subject to the tax law if it were upheld,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari per South Dakota’s request.245
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax
law.246 In his final majority opinion, Justice Kennedy overturned Bellas Hess
and Quill, precedents that were so distant from the economic reality of the
twenty-first century.247 Justice Kennedy reasoned that Quill was flawed on
three distinct grounds: (1) it unnecessarily conflated a substantial-nexus
requirement with a physical-presence requirement, (2) it “create[d] rather
than resolve[d] market distortions,” and (3) it imposed formalistic
distinctions in contravention of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.248
Beyond addressing the incompatibility of the physical-requirement rule in
the internet age, he sharply criticized the injustice the judicial branch and out238. 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 1135.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–92 (2018).
243. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2019).
244. Id.
245. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.
246. Id. at 2099–100.
247. In particular, Justice Kennedy stressed how the arbitrary physical-presence
requirement ignores the physical aspects of modern technology. Id. at 2092. He suggested
that physical presence may be theoretically found via the company’s various activities in South
Dakota, for example, having its website accessible in South Dakota, its cookies saved to a
user’s computer in South Dakota, its app downloaded to the user’s phone in South Dakota, or
its data stored even occasionally in South Dakota. Id. at 2092, 2095.
248. Id. at 2092.
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of-state businesses had brought upon the states.249 He argued that such a
requirement violated vertical-federalism norms and unjustly “intrude[d] on
States’ reasonable choices in enacting their tax systems.”250 Furthermore,
such a rule allowed out-of-state sellers to effectively assist in tax evasion and
deliberately drive state and local governments to insolvency.251
In the absence of a physical-requirement rule, the Court held that South
Dakota’s sales tax effectively applied with a substantial nexus and was thus
constitutional.252 Since the law was designed with dollar and transactional
minimum thresholds before the sales tax remission would be required, it
properly applied only to a seller who “availed itself of the substantial
privilege of carrying on business” in that jurisdiction.253 While settled on the
substantial-nexus issue, the Court left open the possibility that “some other
principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act”
on remand.254 However, the Court highlighted key features that minimize
any discrimination or undue burden on interstate commerce, including its
application only to businesses that meet or surpass certain thresholds,255 a
prohibition on retroactive application, and the state’s adoption of the SSUTA,
which reduces administrative and compliance costs.256
State reactions to Wayfair have varied. Some states have developed laws
similar to South Dakota and others have gone even further.257 Generally
speaking, states fall into one of three categories: (1) twenty states roughly
follow the South Dakota approach, (2) seven states follow the South Dakota
approach but limit or eliminate the transaction threshold, and (3) two states
allow remission of sales taxes with a nexus to the full extent of the
Constitution, which was expanded by Wayfair.258 Notably, Illinois has

249. Id. at 2095.
250. Justice Kennedy observes that forty-one states, two territories, and the District of
Columbia have all urged the Court to overturn Quill. Id.
251. Id. at 2096. Justice Kennedy backs up this assertion with a potpourri of data points,
comparing market conditions from 1992, the year Quill was decided, to 2018, the year Wayfair
was brought within the Court’s purview. Id. at 2097. Internet access has exploded from less
than 2 percent of households to about 89 percent. Id. Remote sales have ballooned from $180
billion to more than $500 billion annually. Id. Revenue losses at the state level from the
physical-presence rule rocketed from somewhere between $694 million and $3 billion to
somewhere between $8 billion and $33 billion annually. Id.
252. Id. at 2100.
253. Id. at 2099.
254. Id.
255. For example, South Dakota’s law only applies to businesses that, on an annual basis,
(1) deliver more than $100,000 in goods or services, or (2) engage in 200 or more separate
transactions for the delivery of such goods or services. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2019).
256. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–100; see supra notes 206–17 and accompanying text.
257. See Irma Esparza Diggs & Brian Egan, What City Leaders Should Know About South
Dakota v. Wayfair, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (June 22, 2018), https://citiesspeak.org/2018/06/22/
what-city-leaders-should-know-about-south-dakota-v-wayfair/
[https://perma.cc/3DRSWMYG].
258. Todd Lard & Jessie Eisenmenger, Video: Eversheds Sutherland’s the Bottom Line:
Reactions to Wayfair, EVERSHEDS (Sept. 11, 2018), https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/
NewsCommentary/Multimedia/214249/Videocast-Reactions-to-Wayfair [https://perma.cc/
D3MN-MX9S].
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followed suit and adopted the South Dakota approach.259 This may further
bolster the validity of Labell, as Chicago has long considered a nexus with
Illinois to be a nexus with Chicago.260
3. Congress: The Internet Tax Freedom Act
A third potential constraint on local taxation of video streaming services
is the ITFA. In a rare act of bipartisanship, Congress enacted the ITFA in
1998 as a means of restricting internet taxation.261 The sponsor of the House
bill, California Representative Chris Cox, stressed that the purpose of the Act
was to protect the internet from the “multiple and discriminatory taxation”
that it was susceptible to “in a way that commerce conducted in more
traditional ways is not.”262 Thus, the ITFA specifically applies to state and
local taxation, where multiple and discriminatory taxation would compound
across the country.263 In particular, the ITFA created a moratorium on
“[t]axes on Internet access”264 and “[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on
electronic commerce.”265 After years of extensions, the ITFA’s two-pronged
moratorium became permanent law through the enactment of the Trade
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.266 Each prong of the
moratorium offers a distinct protection.267
The ITFA broadly defines an “internet access service” as one that “enables
users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, electronic mail
or other services offered over the Internet.”268 The statute applies whether
the tax is imposed on the provider or purchaser, irrespective of what terms
are used in describing it.269 While internet access may include other services
made available to users as part of such a service, the statutory language
explicitly excludes “video programming . . . that utilize[s] Internet protocol
or any successor protocol and for which there is a charge.”270 Although this
definition would prohibit taxation on the underlying internet service that a
user pays for to access internet content, such as a video streaming service, it
would not prohibit taxation of the video streaming service itself. Illustrative
259. Andrew Olson, Chicago Shoppers, Retailers Should Be on the Lookout for Change
After Wayfair Decision, CHI. BUS. J. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/chicago/
news/2018/08/16/retailers-should-beware-after-wayfair-decision.html
[https://perma.cc/
A4AG-95ZD].
260. Id.; see supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text.
261. Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (Supp. 2017).
262. H.R. REP. NO. 105-570, at 29 (1998).
263. See Comcation, Inc. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 61, 76 n.26 (2007).
264. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a)(1). It should be noted that the law included a
grandfather clause allowing those states that had already imposed and enforced internet access
taxes to temporarily continue doing so. Id. § 1104(a)(2)(A).
265. Id. § 1101(a)(2).
266. While the moratorium was made permanent, the grandfather clause under the ITFA
was extended to June 30, 2020. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-125, § 922(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (Supp. 2017)).
267. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a).
268. Id. § 1105(5)(A).
269. Id. § 1105(10)(A).
270. Id. § 1105(5)(D).
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of this point, a recent policy report by the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities271 stressed this distinction while addressing erosion of the sales tax
due to cord-cutting.272
The second prong of the ITFA’s moratorium involves electronic
commerce, or e-commerce, which it defines as “any transaction conducted
over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale, lease,
license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or information.”273
The statute holds that state e-commerce taxation shall be neither multiple nor
discriminatory.274 The prohibition on multiple taxation disallows multiple
states or political subdivisions from taxing the same, or essentially the same,
e-commerce without offering a credit for the taxes paid in other
jurisdictions.275 The ITFA, however, carves out an exception that allows a
state and its own political subdivisions to tax the same e-commerce.276 The
prohibition on discriminatory taxation is more nuanced but effectively
disallows a jurisdiction from taxing e-commerce differently from a
transaction or activity under traditional commerce.277 More specifically, the
ITFA prohibits discrimination of e-commerce from traditional commerce in
terms of which goods and services are taxable,278 which tax rate applies,279
and which individual or entity is responsible for collecting or paying the
tax.280
A good example of how the ITFA is interpreted in practice is the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc.281 In Stubhub!, Chief
Judge Frank Easterbrook interpreted the ITFA as it applied to the validity of
an earlier Chicago amusement tax.282 The City of Chicago sought a
declaratory judgment that StubHub!, an internet ticket auction house, was
required to collect and remit sales taxes on Chicago ticket sales to the City in
line with its amusement tax.283 The court first dismissed the issue of multiple
taxation because the tax applied only to events in Chicago, and thus the
location of the event prohibited other municipalities from levying a tax on

271. See generally MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CONGRESS
SHOULD END—NOT EXTEND—THE BAN ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF INTERNET ACCESS
SUBSCRIPTIONS (2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-10-14sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QWZ-BW7K].
272. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
273. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(3).
274. Id. § 1101(a)(2).
275. Id. § 1105(6)(A).
276. Id. § 1105(6)(B). For example, while Dallas and Houston may not tax the same
e-commerce under the ITFA, Dallas and Texas may do so under this carveout. See id.
277. See JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43772, THE INTERNET TAX
FREEDOM ACT: IN BRIEF 3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2LDK-G52B]. Traditional commerce would include, for example, purchases made in brickand-mortar stores or through catalogs. Id.
278. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(2)(A)(i).
279. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(ii).
280. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(iii).
281. 624 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2010).
282. Id. at 366–67.
283. Id. at 364–65.
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the same e-commerce.284 Similarly, the court dismissed the issue of
discriminatory taxation because the reseller was required to collect and remit
the tax whether the sale occurred on the internet, in person, or otherwise:
hence, no discrimination.285
One final point on the ITFA involves its relation to Wayfair.286 While the
Supreme Court never mentions the ITFA in its Wayfair opinion,
Representative Cox argued in his amicus brief that South Dakota’s law would
controvert both the ITFA and its policy aims.287 Representative Cox first
argued that it was discriminatory because South Dakota’s law would impose
the burden of tax compliance on different persons or entities when a South
Dakota resident purchases from an out-of-state seller over the internet instead
of in person.288 Furthermore, Cox argued that South Dakota’s tax law would
subvert the spirit of the ITFA.289 Cox wrote that even though the law sought
to address the “the presumed competitive burden on [South Dakota’s] in-state
businesses and its purported lost revenue,” the law forced internet sellers to
sift through a “maze of differing state and local rules and competing
definitions, deadlines, filing requirements, and audit demands,” which would
be a substantial burden on internet sellers.290
In spite of Cox’s concerns, it appears as though not everyone agrees: the
issue was neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the Court.291 As the
Tax Foundation asserted in its post-Wayfair analysis, the ITFA was likely
not at issue because so long as state tax laws equally apply to electronic and
traditional forms of commerce, there is no conflict.292

284. Id. at 366.
285. Id. at 366–67.
286. See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
287. Brief of Chris Cox, Former Member of Congress and Co-Author of the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–16, South Dakota v. Wayfair
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494) [hereinafter Brief of Chris Cox]. Cox was the
sponsor of the original ITFA. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
288. Cox starts with the notion that a South Dakota resident could purchase from out-ofstate sellers in one of two ways: (1) through intermediaries such as the internet, mail, and the
like, or (2) in person. Brief of Chris Cox, supra note 287, at 11. Cox argued that the South
Dakota tax law would violate sections 1105(2)(A)(i) and (ii) of the ITFA because it would
“burden[] Internet remote sellers while sparing sellers of exactly the same . . . service[] who
accomplish the transaction through other means” and would put the burden of tax compliance
on the seller if the sale occurred on the internet but on the purchaser if he or she traveled out
of state to purchase the same service. Id. at 11–12.
289. Id. at 16–20.
290. Id. at 12–14.
291. See generally South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
292. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, What Does the Wayfair Decision Really Mean for States,
Businesses, and Consumers?, TAX FOUND. (July 9, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/whatdoes-the-wayfair-decision-really-mean-for-states-businesses-and-consumers/#2
[https://perma.cc/N756-TANE]. The tax law at issue required tax remission by out-of-state
sellers broadly, effectively treating mail order sellers, phone-call sellers, and Internet sellers
alike. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2019).
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III. ACT THREE: FOLLOWING LABELL’S LEAD: THE FUTURE OF
LOCAL VIDEO STREAMING SERVICE TAXATION
As stated by former New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “to the
extent we are making progress as a nation, local governments are often
driving it.”293 Accordingly, “[b]ecause they are held accountable, local
leaders also tend to be more willing to work with members of other political
parties and to experiment with bold new ideas . . . mak[ing] city halls more
nimble, more pragmatic, . . . [and] more open to experimentation.”294 Given
these competencies, cities are uniquely situated to address declining revenues
and state aid.295 As laboratories of democracy with a propensity for fiscal
innovation, cities must take control of their own financial futures.296 In the
wake of Labell, cities now have an opportunity to reflect and consider how
to tax video streaming services, if at all.297
As our economy continues to shift toward the internet, cities need to find
creative ways to expand their tax bases and tap into the revenue potential that
video streaming services provide.298 What would have once sounded
impermissible, if not ludicrous, is increasingly becoming a modern-day
reality: internet sellers being taxed without discriminatorily taxing the
internet itself. On the retail side, Amazon, for example, now collects and
remits sales taxes on goods in forty-six states whether or not it is legally
required to do so.299 Even as these taxes are applied to video streaming
services, other notable trade associations and companies, such as the Internet
Association and Netflix itself, remain unopposed.300 What they remain
concerned about, however, is how the tax is applied. Netflix, for instance,
while unopposed to taxation of its services would consider it “a dangerous
precedent to start taxing Internet apps and websites using laws intended for
utilities like water and electricity.”301 The notion is even more concerning
when one considers that such utilities are taxed at roughly 14 percent, making
them the most highly taxed services in the United States.302
From a bird’s-eye view, it is easy to see how video streaming services such
as Netflix and Hulu may be considered comparable to utilities like traditional
293. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES ANNUAL REPORT: ANNUAL
LETTER ON PHILANTHROPY 10 (2018), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/34/2018/05/
Bloomberg-Philanthropies-Annual-Report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JBD-2AHP].
294. Id. at 9–10.
295. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
297. Such reflection is only natural after a trial. See RENÉE ZELLWEGER, Nowadays, on
CHICAGO: MUSIC FROM THE MIRAMAX MOTION PICTURE (Epic Records 2002) (conveying
Roxie Hart’s deeply introspective feeling of posttrial emptiness).
298. For example, applying the Chicago amusement tax to video streaming services is
expected to raise well over $12 million and cut into the expected $98 million deficit in 2019.
Kristin Tate, Will You Have to Pay the Netflix Tax?, HILL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/
opinion/finance/421594-will-you-have-to-pay-the-netflix-tax [http://perma.cc/SXJ3-8WGD].
299. See Snider, supra note 7. Amazon does not collect sales tax in all fifty states because
not all states have sales tax. See WALCZAK & DRENKARD, supra note 77, at 1.
300. See Snider, supra note 7.
301. The statement was provided by Netflix’s then-spokesperson, Jonathan Friedland. Id.
302. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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pay-TV and other MVPDs. The user pays a price and in exchange gains
access to watch video content.303 As traditional pay-TV providers make
select video content streamable on mobile phones, computers, and the like,304
the line between the two is blurred even further. But as the Kentucky Board
of Tax Appeals held in Netflix, while the similarities end there, the
distinctions are far greater.305
At the federal level, administrative agencies continue to keep MVPDs and
video streaming services distinct. The FCC has elected not to retrofit these
services into the “clunky and outdated” term of art that is an MVPD, which
insulates these services from a myriad of telecommunications regulations.306
Furthermore, with the U.S. Copyright Office drawing the same distinction,
video streaming services may not acquire copyright licenses to show
broadcast programming even if they wanted to.307 As such, these services
are unable to provide the live and scheduled linear programming that MVPDs
provide.
These distinctions merit different tax treatment. In Netflix, the court
specifically highlighted aspects of the FCC’s distinct treatment of video
streaming services in finding Netflix not generally comparable to MVPDs
and thus not subject to the state’s telecommunications tax.308 With legal
challenges to taxing video streaming services as MVPDs either already in
litigation, as in Creve Coeur, or ripe for litigation, such as the various
California municipalities, cities should be wary of taxing video streaming
services in line with MVPDs, especially when other viable options such as
the sales and amusement taxes exist.309
Prudent cities should take note of the relevant judicial developments from
2018 as discussed in this Note and use them to guide future tax changes.310
From the humble chambers of Cook County to the highest court in the land,
judges have set forth an effective path for video streaming service taxation
apart from MVPDS.311 It is time for cities to listen.
This Part combines the reasoning of Labell and Wayfair to set forth a
roadmap for future local taxation of video streaming services under the sales
or amusement tax base. Part III.A discusses the sales tax as applied to video
streaming services. It argues that while this may be an effective way to bring
these services into the fold, its practical and theoretical drawbacks should
make cities wary. Part III.B instead considers the amusement tax as applied
to video streaming services and argues that such an approach may be a
303. See What Is Netflix?, supra note 17.
304. See, e.g., Dave Schafer, Which Cable Providers Let Me Stream TV Anywhere?,
CABLETV.COM (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.cabletv.com/blog/which-cable-providers-letme-stream-tv-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/8SX7-DWF4] (comparing various MVPD
streaming apps, including SpectrumTV and DISH Anywhere).
305. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 159–71 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 172–81 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
311. See supra Part II.A.2; see also supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
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preferable option for cities given the easier procedural hurdles, strong
theoretical backing, and judicial precedent in its favor.
A. The Sales Tax Approach Is Effective but Suffers from
Practical and Theoretical Drawbacks
The sales tax is one effective method to tax video streaming services
independently of MVPDs, as illustrated by Pennsylvania.312 Previously,
requiring extrajurisdictional sellers to collect and remit the tax may have been
a serious challenge, but the Supreme Court’s elimination of the physicalpresence requirement in Wayfair appears to have mitigated this issue.313
A prudent city would be mindful of the key features that contributed to the
success of South Dakota’s tax in Wayfair, more specifically the lack of
retroactive applicability and the existence of minimum thresholds before
requiring collection and remission by the seller.314 Although the Court also
highlighted South Dakota’s adoption of the SSUTA, this aspect appeared in
dicta and seems to be more a suggestion to ease administration rather than a
concrete constitutional requirement.315 So long as a city is mindful of these
caveats, Wayfair not only provides support for the validity of such taxation,
but also suggests clear rationales for such taxes, with Justice Kennedy all but
endorsing them in light of the modern shift to an internet-based economy.316
While an effective way to raise revenue, taxing video streaming services
under the sales tax still brings with it two substantial drawbacks, one
procedural and one theoretical. From a procedural standpoint, because sales
taxes often encompass only goods, extending the sales tax to include video
streaming services would seem to require legislative action rather than simple
interpretive rulemaking.317 For example, only twenty-seven states tax digital
goods, and even fewer define video streaming services as digital goods.318
Those that do, including Pennsylvania and Washington, did not simply issue
interpretive rulings but instead passed legislative amendments.319 Given
their limited tax discretion under home-rule provisions, cities that seek to do
the same would have a procedural burden: not only would these cities need
legislative action from their local bodies, but they likely would require state
approval as well.320
The second major drawback is theoretical. While it is perfectly reasonable
to treat a permanent digital video download in line with physical goods under
the sales tax, treating a video streaming service as such is a greater stretch.
Permanent downloads represent actual ownership of something, an actual

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
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purchase in the truest sense of the word.321 The same cannot be said for
typical video streaming services, where viewing particular video content is
restricted to a specific rental period, as is the case for TVODs such as iTunes,
or conditioned upon a continued subscription, as is the case for SVODs such
as Netflix.322 Perhaps for this very reason, some states that allow for the
taxation of digital goods explicitly exclude video streaming services,323 and
cities that have sales taxes have opted to tax video streaming services outside
of the sales tax base, as Chicago did with its amusement tax.324
B. The Amusement Tax Has Numerous Advantages,
Including Clear Judicial Support
Instead of treating a user’s purchase of video streaming services as the use
of a utility or purchase of a digital good, tax authorities should consider such
a purchase for what it is—a license to view an amusement. For instance,
when a consumer pays for a license to view a movie at a movie theater or a
baseball game at a stadium, she is subject to the amusement tax.325 It is a
reasonable extension for the same to apply when such amusement takes place
on the internet. Using Netflix as an example, when a user pays her monthly
subscription bill, she is given a login which allows her to stream all of
Netflix’s movies and shows.326 Recasting the user’s login as a ticket, the
transaction is no different than any other amusement transaction where a user
pays for a ticket to view an amusement.
Of course, some may take issue with comparing a solitary Netflix viewing
to an amusement like a public sporting event, theatrical performance, or
movie. This Note argues two responses in the alternative. First, there is no
built-in explicit requirement that a user must take part in an amusement of a
social nature for the tax to apply.327 On the contrary, while one may attend
a movie screening at a theater with other individuals, socializing does not
take place during the actual viewing of the movie.
Second, assuming some inherent public-facing social requirement under
an ejusdem generis argument,328 the internet nature of video streaming
services is both the problem and the solution. Yet another way the internet
has changed our world is via its social upheaval. With Facebook, Twitter,
Reddit, and a litany of messaging apps, Netflix users can communicate about
their experiences with friends and other users in real time and socialize just

321. See Purchase, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The acquisition of an
interest in real or personal property by sale.”).
322. See supra Part I.A.
323. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.A.2.
325. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
326. See What Is Netflix?, supra note 17.
327. See, e.g., City of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., Amusement Tax Ruling #5 (June 9, 2015).
328. Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[W]hen a general
word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to
include only items of the same class as those listed.”).
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as they would at other in-person amusements.329 In fact, one of Netflix’s
core competencies is its ability to provide entertainment that generates
greater social media virality than its peers.330 For example, take the
extraordinary social buzz surrounding Netflix’s recent film Bird Box.331 The
thriller is set in a post-apocalyptic world where survivors must blindfold
themselves to outlast mysterious forces that kill upon sight.332 After its
December 21, 2018, launch on the video streaming service, Bird Box not only
garnered a record-setting forty-five million streams in just two weeks, but
spawned countless memes and real-life “challenges” where individuals
attempt to navigate life blindfolded.333 As this illustrates, while viewing
video streaming services may seem solitary, video streaming services often
generate mass social interactions, both online and in person, and thus may be
comparable to the examples provided for in amusement tax statutes.
In practice, a video streaming service need not fit perfectly with related
amusements under existing amusement tax laws. In 2014, for example, a
hotly contested “yoga tax” was passed in Washington, D.C. that treated yoga,
an arguably spiritual practice rather than a physical one, in line with gyms
and recreational sports despite criticism to the contrary.334 However, even if
video streaming services like Netflix are considered generally comparable to
amusements under amusement tax statutes, cities should not sit back and
expect these companies to voluntarily make the leap and accept duties to
collect from city consumers.335 It is time for cities to remove their blindfolds,
recognize the tax loophole that allows these streaming services to go untaxed,
and address the situation head-on. This is the exact purpose of interpretive
rulings, which allow a tax commissioner to clarify where ambiguity exists
and exercise expertise that is afforded deference by the courts.336 Where an
amusement tax is enumerated with specific examples but included with broad
329. Over a third of the global population uses social media to communicate, often in real
time. See Audrey Willis, 6 Ways Social Media Changed the Way We Communicate, CIRCA
INTERACTIVE (Aug. 15, 2017), https://circaedu.com/hemj/how-social-media-changed-theway-we-communicate/ [https://perma.cc/QD48-DNGM].
330. See Thomas Franck, A Secret to Netflix’s Success: Social Media, CNBC (June
28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/28/a-secret-to-netflixs-success-social-media.html
[https://perma.cc/2J4W-VF4H] (quoting an industry analyst: “If [Netflix]’s platform is more
conducive to producing ‘viral’ content, this could be a sustainable advantage over traditional
media.”).
331. See Aja Romano, Why Are Bird Box Memes So Popular? It’s Complicated., VOX
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/4/18165825/bird-box-memes-netflix-popularexplained [https://perma.cc/L98B-B5GW].
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See Antonia Blumberg, Criticism of Washington D.C. ‘Yoga Tax’ Raises Questions
About Spirituality vs. Fitness, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 9, 2014, 1:16 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/09/dc-yoga-tax_n_5958594.html [https://perma.cc/
ER98-P43Q].
335. For example, while Amazon collected state taxes even prior to Wayfair, the same was
not true for local taxes. See Ben Casselman, As Amazon Steps Up Tax Collections, Some Cities
Are Left Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/25/business/
economy/amazon-tax.html [https://perma.cc/4BRV-NHMP].
336. See supra Part I.B.2.
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encompassing language such as “any” or “similar,” the term may be
construed descriptively rather than restrictively.337 An administrative
interpretation that clarifies this broad language is not impermissible but is,
on the contrary, afforded weight by the courts.338 This was the very approach
taken by Chicago’s tax commissioner, which the court upheld in Labell.339
Labell provides a clear legal roadmap for cities to tax video streaming
services under amusement taxes without implicating legal concerns.
Particularly, Labell suggests answers to the three key constraints on local
taxation described in Part II.C, including restrictions by states, the Supreme
Court, and Congress.
First, as to state restrictions, many noteworthy cities, including Chicago,
Philadelphia, New York City, and Santa Cruz, already have amusement taxes
on the books.340 So long as these tax statutes are written broadly rather than
restrictively, it is well within a tax commissioner’s powers to issue an
interpretive ruling rather than implicate the legislative process and the
corresponding home-rule issues.341 For example, while the plaintiffs in
Labell originally challenged the tax commissioner’s authority in issuing
Amusement Tax Ruling #5, the plaintiffs later dropped this argument, and
the case largely narrowed to the federal issues at play.342
However, even where a city has a restrictive amusement tax, or lacks one
altogether, the amusement tax still retains a significant procedural advantage
over its sales tax counterpart. As a specialized tax, the amusement tax often
skirts cumbersome procedural requirements and avoids required local
resident voting or state legislative authorization.343 As such, changing or
implementing an amusement tax is comparatively easy.
Second, as to dormant Commerce Clause issues, Labell found the
substantial-nexus requirement satisfied, even before the standard was
considerably lowered in Wayfair.344 Chicago follows Illinois’s nexus
requirement, which has since adopted the very sort of tax collection and
remission requirements that were upheld in Wayfair.345 While Wayfair dealt
specifically with a sales tax, the amusement tax may be recast as such under
the substance-over-form doctrine given that both are consumption taxes
applied on a percentage basis.346 Thus, even the amusement tax may be
bolstered by the Court’s holding in Wayfair.
Third, as to the ITFA issue, as Labell held, taxing video streaming services
as amusements does not pose a substantial risk of multiple taxation because
337. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Sheppard, 123 F.2d
773, 775 (5th Cir. 1941).
338. See id.
339. See supra Part II.A.2.
340. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
341. See supra Part II.A.2.
342. See supra Part II.A.2.
343. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 242–56 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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the tax relied on a user’s Chicago address and was not discriminatory.347
Given the ITFA’s policy aim of preventing disparate treatment of the internet
for fear of internet discrimination, amusement taxes not only conform to such
a policy aim but reinforce it. Without video streaming service taxation in
line with other amusements, online amusements such as Netflix are not
discriminated against but rather given an unfair advantage. Taxing them in
line with their in-person counterparts under the amusement tax would place
the internet on equal footing with in-person amusements and promote the
very sort of equity sought by the ITFA.348
CONCLUSION
While the amusement tax provides a usable model for cities to follow, not
all cities have such a tax base, especially those in states that have adopted the
SSUTA. With extensive variety in consumption taxes and the practical
difficulty of passing new taxes given the tight constraints of home-rule
provisions, cities should feel empowered to issue interpretive rulings
wherever appropriate to bring video streaming service tax revenue into their
coffers. While such an attempt may pose greater legal challenges, cities
should not be afraid to get creative to raise revenue. They should just
remember that when dealing with a tough legal challenge, they should hire
Billy Flynn and razzle-dazzle away.

347. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.

